MACHINE-MADE JUSTICE: SOME IMPLICATIONS
JOSEPH J. SPENGLER*

I cannot think it will ever be safe to repose much trust in the moral sense of any machine.
-Samuel Butler, in Erewhon ch. 23.
Many important considerations ... do not lend themselves easily to mathematical expression.... And hence arises a tendency towards assigning wrong proportions to ...
forces; those elements being most emphasized which lend themselves most easily to
analytical methods.-Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 850 (8th ed. 1920).
This essay has to do with certain implications of the use of computers and other
mechanical instruments in the definition and the administration of justice. Justice
is conceived in its all-inclusive classical sense of giving to every man his due and
thereby contributing to the augmentation of a population's "welfare." Specific
references to the attainment of justice under criminal or private law or within the
administrative process are intended only to illustrate aspects of the argument; they
are not intended to focus the argument upon a certain category of justice or to
confine the application of the argument. This essay is prompted by the belief that,
even when a great deal of incontrovertible information is present, the judgment and
discretion of men of broad humanism must complement the findings of those of a
narrower scientific bent; otherwise the art of statecraft is bound to suffer.'
In skeletal form our argument runs as follows. In section one it is contended
that any reduction in individual freedom from constraint below the minimum
necessary to achieve "justice" and (hence) "welfare" reduces the attainable "welfare" of the population? In section two it is shown how the use of computers and
*A.B. x926, M.A. 1929, Ph.D. 1930, Ohio State University. James B. Duke Professor of Economics,
Duke University. Editor and contributor, NATURAL Rasouncss AND ECONOMIC GRow-m (i96!); Editor,
[with Ralph Braibanti], ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC DavE.LosMaErr IN INDIA (x963). Contributor to
periodicals and symposia dealing with demography, economics, political science, and sociology.
The author is greatly indebted to Professor Ralph Braibanti and to Mr. Walter L. Johnson for
suggestions which have improved the content and the presentation of the theme of this essay; he is, of
course, solely responsible for its defects.
'The importance of the role of value judgment in decision making has been admirably stated by
Professor Ralph Braibanti: "The lesser the bureaucratic disposition to reduce the data to incontrovertible,
or at least empirically oriented factors, or the lesser the capacity of the data to be so reduced, the greater
the dimensions of the -value judgment sector. The value environment of decision making has been
submitted to only minimal scrutiny in -studies of bureaucracy, probably because its elusiveness makes it
inherently more amenable to philosophic illumination than to empirical analysis....
The expansion
of bureaucratic discretion directs attention to the predispositions which mold the values held by men who
make the decisions, so that the traditions, ethos, and training of the bureaucrat is of crucial significance,
a significance directly proportional to the scope of discretionary power which he possesses." See Braibanti,
The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis, 58 SotrrH ATrLANrsC Q. 258, 261 (1959).
' On difficulties attending the formulation of adequate indicators of "welfare," see R. DUNCAN &
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similar instruments may operate to reduce freedom from constraint below this
necessary minimum. In section three we point to developments in the administrative
structure of modern states that are likely to accentuate the tendency described in
the second section.
I
FREEDOM FROM CONSTRAINT AND WELFARE

The objective of our arrangements respecting the definition and the administration of what we call "justice" is generally assumed to be the augmentation of the
"welfare" of the population composing the community. We may define augmentation of welfare in one of several ways. We may say that aggregate welfare is
increased by whatever augments the welfare of some without at the same time
diminishing that of others. Or we may define welfare in such a way that we may
speak of changes in the social welfare function of the people composing our community. For the purposes of my argument either definition of welfare suffices,
particularly since the first may be viewed as a special case of the second. I shall,
however, usually express myself in terms of the second definition since it is more
general as well as better suited to the needs of expositive convenience.
Evaluation of the use of computers and similar instruments in the administration
of justice turns in part on the purpose which "justice," viewed as an instrument of
"social control," is intended to serve. We may define this purpose as the augmentadon of the magnitude of that social welfare function W, which the members of a
society are endeavoring to maximize. We need not, of course, define the content
of this function since that content tends to vary in space as well as in time. We
shall take it for granted, however, that the most economical of the available methods
of administering justice needs to be chosen when several or more methods appear
initially to be equally well suited to increase this social welfare function W by a
given amount. For the resultant saving in time and in justice-administering inputs
permits a further increase in the value of W; and this increase may be significant
when courts and personnel are in short supply, court dockets are crowded, and the
final disposition of cases tends to lag far behind their emergence. Indeed, the
possibility of such savings will become a strong motive for the use of computers,
and so on.
For the purposes of this essay, laws and decrees, among them those intended to
give rise to "justice," are looked upon as collectively imposed constraints designed
to augment the magnitude of the collectivity's social welfare function W. These
legal instruments, by interdicting certain acts and certain uses of goods and services,
make more goods and services available for other uses; they thus may be said (albeit
somewhat incorrectly) to perform a creative function in so far as they make the
flow of non-interdicted goods and services greater than it otherwise would have been.
We shall couch our subsequent discussion in terms of the language of constraints.
Let us include in a universal set S all the behavior of the members of a community which can or does affect, positively or negatively, the social welfare function
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W which the collectivity is bent upon maximizing. Let us suppose, furthermore,
that this community's legislature believes correctly that, if W is to be maximized,
some but not all of the behavior in S needs to be subjected -to a minimum degree of
constraint. Let us include in sub-set S' all the behavior in need of such constraint
and in sub-set S" all the behavior not in need of constraint. Finally, let us include
in sub-set C all the behavior in S that becomes subject to constraint when all the
rules and doctrines designed to carry out the enacted constraining legislation have
been put into effect. If these rules and doctrines are so designed and carried out
that they just actualize the intent of ihe legiilatuire, sub-sets C and S' will be
coterminous and equal in scope. The happy outcome may not be realized, however. The rules and doctrines introduced and.employed to administer the enacted
legislation may exceed the intent of the legislature; they may provide for more
constraint than the minimum required to maximize W. If this be the case, C will
entrench upon S" and exceed S' in scope.
When'C exceeds S', some if not all individuals enjoy less freedom from constraint
than the legislature correctly believed was essential to the maximization of W.
(We are ignoring the case in which the constraints imposed by the legislature are
unwittingly excessive, since a fortiori our argument then becomes stronger). In
consequence they cannot make as nice adjustments to the parameters of constraint
intended by the legislature. Moreover, there can be no costless provision for the
adequate compensation of those whom the bureaucrats have deprived of some of
the freedom from constraint which the legislature correctly found essential to the
maximization of W; for this excess constraint has not generated somewhere in the
system a surplus of benefits out of which injured individuals might be compensated.
The rationale of the argument of'this paragraph is easily indicated.
Every individual has an order of choice which reflects his income, his education,
the amount of relevant information at his disposal, as well as other of the conditions
constituting the matrix of circumstances within which his chioosing among alternatives is carried on. Among these conditions is the degree of constraint to which he
is subjected by the collectivity through legislation, and so on. The higher the position
to which an individual is able to attain on his order of choice, the better off he is.
Furthermore, the community of which an individual is a member will also be
better off, given that, our individual moves only as high on his order of choice as
is.
compatible with no other member of the community having his position on his
own orde of choice lowered. The situation here described as preferable is not
necessarily the best which a community may attain, given some specific social welfare function W to be maximized, since there' may be more constraint provided
than is required to permit the maximization of W. It is adequate, however, to lend
support to the type of argument here being advanced? For the situation envisaged
is analogous to that of a "free market" which, while itpermits the individual qua
individual
to choose among alternatives, "does not establish the optimum social
8
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the economic aspects of welfare, see I. M. D. LiT'rLE, A CirTIQUE OF WVEL'AE
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state in the. sense that individuals, if called upon to vote politically (act collectively)
for or against the market-determined state in opposition to a series of alternatives,
would consistently choose it."4
Given the matrix of conditions surrounding an individual's acts of choosing
among alternatives, he is most likely :to reach the highest position on" his order of
choice, attainable without worsening any other individual's position, if he is un:constrained and free to move along his order of choice, subject only to the restrictions
intended by the legislature. He might; of course, be able to reach a higher position
if somehow his education were increased, or more relevant information were put at
his disposal, or some other element in his matrix of choice-surrounding conditions
were modified. Given this- matrix of conditions, however,, or (for that matter)
any other matrix of conditions, he needs to be free of" constraints if he is to attain
the most preferred position open to him. Analysis of the behavior even of sometimes irrational economic decision-makers suggests that our individual, if unconstrained, will presumably tend to respond rationally to changes in the matrix of
conditions surrounding him- even though he sometimes indulges in irrational
behavior.'
.
The matrix of conditions. surrounding an individual's acts of choosing may be
modified, as has been suggested, to include constraints. These constraints may be. of
the sort which reduce welfare .(e.g., governmental support of monopoly pricing),
or they may be of a sort which bring about greater consistency between the situation
likely to emerge in a society and the situation implicit in that. society's social welfare
function W. In either instanice, however, and especially in the. latter, freedom of
choice is essential if each individual is to be enabled to reach -his most preferred
position, compatibly with the specified matrix of conditions and with the restriction
that no other individual's position is lowered.
The argument advanced has emphasized only the instrumental value of freedom
from constraints. As Frank Knight points out, however, freedom, or its possession,
may also have absolute value in that a representative individual might prefer a
given amount of freedom even if realization of this amount entailed (as is unlikely)
a diminution in the welfare (exclusive of freedom) he might otherwise attain.'
7
Such an evaluation of "freedom" seems to have been endorsed also by Lord Acton.
It was given psychological support, furthermore, by I. P. Pavlov, when he argued
that there exists a special freedom reflex,' and by P. A. Sorokin, when he indicated
See Buchanan, Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets, 62 J. POL. EcoN. r22 (1954).
See Gary S. Becker's interesting essay, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. EcoN.
1-13 (1962).
' See his FREEDOM AND REFORM 55-56 (1947); also Free Society: Its Basic Nature and Problems, 57
PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 49, 51 (948).
See his EssAYs ON FREEDOM AND POWER 51 (Himmelfarb ed. 1949).

"The freedom reflex is one of the most important reflexes, or, if we use a more general term, reactions, of living beings.... If the animal were not provided with the reflex of protest against boundaries
set to its freedom, the smallest obstacle in its path would interfere with the proper fulfillment of its
natural functions." See CONDITMONED REFLEXES 12 (G. V. Anrap transl. 1927), cited in 3 P. A. SOROKIN,
SOCIAL AND CuLuRAL DYNAmICS 174 (1937).
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"aminimum of Sensate liberty" to be essential to the survival of groups as well as
of individuals. We shall, however, rest our argument only upon the instrumental
value of freedom from constraint.
In this section we have argued, in effect, that if a community of people wishes to
maximize some social welfare function W, it may have to impose upon its members
some optimal amount 0 of constraint, and that, given 0, welfare can then be
greatest only if each individual is free to make the best adjustment he can to his
environment and his fellows within the boundary fixed by constraint 0. This
possibility tended to materialize when sub-set C approximated S', and it receded
as C tended to exceed S' and carry constraint beyond 0. In the next section we
shall argue that the use of computers in the definition and administration of justice
can easily cause C to exceed S'and thus augment constraint above the optimum level
0 and thereby diminish the magnitude of W.
II
CONcEPTuAL RxGIDIT

AND BIAS

The function of conceptual structures is to illuminate that part of reality to which
they supposedly relate and perhaps to increase man's ability to adjust to this part of
reality or otherwise cope with it. Underlying reality is characterized by continuity
and by'great propensity to variation (if only in minor particulars over shorter periods
of time). Superficially at least, any one of a vast number of conceptual structures
may appear compatible with some portion of reality. In the end, however, one or
several may be quite superior, on some principle such as Occam's razor, to the others,
at least in the sense of affording an explanation of that portion of reality to which
they relate. This appearance of compatibility is fostered, of course, by the fact
that no conceptual or theoretical structure deals with reality as such; it merely
abstracts from reality and so in effect deals with supposed indicators of reality.1"
The conceptual structure employed by a scientist helps to determine what he
"sees", how he interprets it, and, if he is an administrator, how he tends to apply
what he thinks he sees. Thus this structure sharpens and directs his focus, albeit
conceivably upon relatively less significant portions of reality, given the intent of
his inquiry. Recourse to one rather than to some other theoretical or conceptual
structure imposes an opportunity cost on its user, at least for the time being; it
denies to him the opportunity to have recourse to other conceptual structures. This
cost may, of course, be of negligible significance if the conceptual structure chosen
is the one best suited to facilitate the inquiry in question and solve the problem
prompting this inquiry. It may be of great significance, however, if the conceptual

structure chosen directs inquiry along relatively unfruitful lines.
We may turn for purposes of illustration to the Whorfian hypothesis that the
'Id. at 173-75.
oSee my Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values, and Politico-Economic Development,
BRAIBANrI & JOSEPH J. SPENGLER
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structure of a people's language determines the "world view" of their culture.

Among the implications of this hypothesis is the view that each language tends to
facilitate some kinds of expression and inquiry, and to hinder others. Categorization, and so on, are affected accordingly. For, as J. A. Fishman remarks, "What is
easily codifiable, and the specific range and content of easily codeable categories, does

depend on the particular language under consideration."'" And, as R. D. Gastil
observes, if a man thinking or expressing himself in a given language does not,
because that language lacks certain words and forms, "have the means to do a

certain job of thinking or expressing, that job will not be accomplished as well
as if he had such means."' 2

This type of handicap was experienced by Galileo

when, in his inquiry into uniformly accelerated motion, he underestimated the role
of the time factor. He lacked the necessary idiom and the theory of fluxions which
Newton was to develop; and so the "time factor" was slow to receive due weight in

the representations of reality employed. N. R. Hanson points to the underlying
reason :13

But it is understandable why this factor should so long have been overlooked: thinking

new thoughts in a conceptual framework not designed to express them requires unprecedented physical insights. In the history of physics few could sense the importance
of things not yet expressible in current idioms. The task of the few has been to find

means of saying what is for others unsayable.
The obverse of this sort of explanation is that, as the Whorfian hypothesis suggests,
if there is ready to hand a collection of verbal symbols seemingly suited to
express what they are not really suited to say, that which is observed is likely to be
compressed into these symbols and thereby distorted, particularly if these symbols
are limited in number as well as in applicability to the task of expressing the
observed.14
In as much as unique factors and unique combinations of possible circumstances
are among the elements constituting specific cases, uniqueness is present in nearly
every case that arises for consideration and study, or calls for solution, and must be
taken into account if a satisfactory solution is to be forthcoming. Uniqueness is a
less important source of concern, of course, at the level of explanation than at the level
of application where neglect of uniqueness, owing to conceptual inflexibility, may
significantly distort findings. At the level of explanation it usually is possible to abstract from some if not from all of the uniqueness associated with individual cases or
instances. For example, if we are isolating for purposes of explanation the attributes
of actions which render them illegal we look to such general characteristics as legality,
11 See Fishman, A Systematization of the Whorfian Hypothesis, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 323, 330
(196o). On B. L. Whor's theory, see also Radnitzky, Some Remarks on the Whorfian Hypothesis, 6
id. 153-57 (196i), and RoGER BROWN, WowS AND TmNGS Ch. 7 (1959).
"'Cited by Fishman, supra note ix, at 328-29.
' N. R. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY 46 (x958).
esp. ch. 3 (Langer transl. 1945). See also Newman,
14 See FRNsr CASSIRER, LANGUAGE ANM Mrr
The Patterns of Vowels and Consonants in Various Languages, 64 Ams. PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 369 (x95r).
Newman finds largeness of a people's vocabulary to be associated with the complexity of its culture and
cultural history.
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conduct, harm, concurrence of conduct and harm, mens rea, causation, and so on. But
when we are seeking to determine if some specific action is criminal, together with
the guilt (if any) of its alleged perpetrator, we must ascertain if the rules defining and
distinguishing particular crimes identify the specific action in question to be a
criminal one, and if doctrines (e.g., of insanity, coercion, and so on) which fix
certain aspects of crime in general define the specific action in question to have
16
been performed in such a way-as to meet these more general requirements of crime.
At the level of application-in the present example, at the concrete level at ,which
criminal justice is administered-generality is limited, uniqueness is important,
and many more or less concrete elements must be taken into account. For this
reason-the conceptual structure employed must be applied quite flexibly.
A, digital computer has been defined as "a general-purpose symbol-manipulating
device... .f- appropriate programs are written for it, it can. be made to produce
symbolic output that can be compared with the stream of verbalizations of a human
being who is thinking aloud while solving problems " '6 It handles a small amount
of information very rapidly (sometimes indeed with potentially dangerous rapidity)
whereas the human nervous. system handles many items of information simultaneously though much more slowly.' "It promises," Leonard Uhr optimistically
believes, "within the next ten years, to actually achieve-in potential-all the powers
of the human brain.' 8 Even so, the kinds of* inquiries, the kinds of information
storage and retrieval,: and -the kinds of multivariate analysis of which a computer
seems capable in respect of the determination of justice appear to be limited,
certainly more limited than those of which the -humanbrain is capable in the aggregate. For the world of justice is -very complex, especially when translated into
terms of individual cases requiring adjudication rather than in terms of a genus of
cases requiring only general discussion. What Clarkson and Simon observe in
another connection seems pertinent therefore in the present connection :'
The real world is still orders of magnitude more complex than the simulations we can

handle on present or prospective computers. We still need to think, and think hard,
about what part of reality needs to be incorporated in the model if it is to provide

reasonable answers to -the questions we wish to ask of it.

This complexity of the real world, be it in the realm of justice or elsewhere,
may therefore cause use of computers to make for imperfect analysis and for bias
in the interpretation of results, especially in the realm of justice, as well as for
1See Hall, Some Basic Questions Regarding Legal Classification for Professional and Scientific
Purposes, 5 J. LEGAL ED. 338 (953).
"0Newell & Simon, Computer Simulation of Human Thinking, 134 SCIENCE 2o16 (x96x). See also
Clarkson & Simon, Simulation of Individual and Group Behavior, 5o AM. EcoN. REv. 920, 924-25 (196o).
" See S. Ulam's review of JOHN VON NEUMANN, THE COMPUTER AND mE BRAIN, Scientific American,
June 1958, pP. 127, 128. See also Neisser, The Imitation of Man by Machine, 139 ScIENCe 193, 196-97
(1963)' 8 Uhr, Intelligence in Computers: The Psychology of Perception in People and in Machines, 5
BEAVIORAL SCIENCE 178 (1960). But for differences between man and machine, see Neisser, supra
note 17.
19 Clarkson & Simon, supra note 16, at 930.
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misapplication of the findings of imperfect analysis. Problems in this realm are
likely to be of the sort that are poorly adapted to computer solution or simulation.;
they are likely to be essentially non-routine in character and to involve inputs,
outputs, programs, and parameters (e.g., values) which are not very measurable
and which are hard (if not impossible) to define finitely and with necessary
precision. If analysts seek to escape these shortcomings by treating elements of a
problem as independent, routine elements when in fact these elements constitute a
kind of meaning-giving gestalt, they will misinterpret the significance of these
elements, and they will accentuate this misinterpretation if they also neglect (as they
are likely to do) matter which is recalcitrant to routinization and decomposition into
simple elements. If application is not made of such imperfect findings, only limited
harm results, namely, deceleration of the rate of growth of knowledge. If, however,
these findings are applied, much greater harm can result. Even so, the disposition
to apply such imperfect and misleading findings will be great. There will always
be the pressure of economy, to save time and factor inputs, especially when these are
in quite short supply. There will also be the even greater pressure of man's inclination to accept seemingly concrete answers and to avoid responsibility for hard
decisions, especially when escape from such pressure appears to be found in computer-based answers and decisions. The computer is thus easily converted into an
anxiety-relieving deus ex machina, whose utterances are susceptible of being interpreted as those of Allah. Whence Johnson and Kohler warn us not to turn over
to the computer responsibilities with which man is better able to cope:20
It is being called on to act for man in areas where man cannot define his own ability
to perform and where he feels uneasy about his own performance-where he would like
a neat, well-structured solution and feels that in adopting the machine's partial solution
he is closer to the "right" than he is in using his own. An aura of respectability surrounds a computer output, and this, together with the time-balance factor, makes unqualified acceptance tempting.
This warning is confirmed by Neisser:21
If machines really thought as men do, there would be no more reason to fear them
than to fear men. But computer intelligence is indeed "inhuman": it does not grow,
has no emotional basis, and is shallowly motivated. These defects do not matter in
technical applications, where the criteria of successful problem solving are relatively
simple. They become extremely important if the computer is used to make social
decisions, for there our criteria of adequacy are as subtle and as multiply motivated as
human thinking itself.
Perhaps relevant also is Norbert Wiener's conclusion that the "human brain is a far
more effective control apparatus than is the intelligent machine when we come to
2
higher areas of logic" and (his analysis implies) policy?
Further elaboration of the dangers attending computer use, to which attention
Kohler, The Man-Computer Relationship, 138 SCIENcE 879 (1962).
,1 Neisser, supra note 17, 2t 197.
" Wiener, Some Moral and Technical Consequences of Automation, 131 ScIENCE 1357 (ig6o).
2"ohnson &
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has been drawn in the preceding paragraphs, is unnecessary at this stage of our
argument. It is now in order, however, to draw attention to a problem of major
importance in the realm of justice and one which incorporates in itself some of the
difficulties already noted. The administration of justice can contribute most
effectively to the augmentation of individual and total welfare when it is flexible,
adapted to the uniqueness of cases and to variability and change in circumstances,
and is carried out subject to no more constraint than the minimum essential to the
accomplishment of the purported aim of the legislation on which rests the administration of justice in concrete instances. Optimal administration of justice therefore
entails non-rigidity in the conceptual structure on which it is based, particularly at
the level of application. Yet, as will be shown, the introduction of computers and
similar instruments can easily be accompanied by rigidification of the legal and
related conceptual structure.
Conceptual rigidity tends to arise if the concepts used and the information
available for the definition and administration of justice are only partially adapted
to the requirements of computer programming. Table one has been devised to
illustrate this point. In the first column, Cc designates the concepts adapted to
computer programming, and Cr, the concepts not currently suited thereto. C is the
TABLE I
Information

Concepts
Required

Available

Co

Ir

I

C=C.+Cl

I=Io+I

I.=I. +I.,

set of concepts including both C. and Cr; presumably all concepts included in this
set are adapted to non-computer use even though Ce is sequestered because of its
adaptability to computer use. In the second column, I, designates that kind of
information which is both required in representative cases and is adapted to computer
manipulation. Since I denotes all the information required for the satisfactory
determination of such cases, I designates the required residuum of information
not adaptable to computer manipulation though susceptible of manipulation in other
ways. I in the third column denotes all the relevant information actually in existence and accessible; it is subdivided into I, information both actually or potentially available and adaptable to computer use, and Iy, other information actually
or potentially available though not adapted to computer use. It is evident that if
I.. approximates I, the cases in question can be readily handled. Furthermore,
they can be handled through partial use of computers if also Ia0 approximates 1e in
keeping with concepts Cc. Difficulties may arise, however, if . falls quite short of
I, even when I. approximates Ir. To these difficulties we may now turn.
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In a legal world wholly adapted to the requirements of computer programming,
all the concepts employed would be of the category C, sort, and Ia, the information
actually or potentially available, would approximate both I,, and Ic. There would
be no need for the use of concepts Cr or for information Ir. These computeroriented conditions are unlikely to be met, however, at least for a long time. Many
utilized concepts (as well as both required and accessible information) answer to the
categorical descriptions appearing on the second line in the body of table one.
Accordingly, those bent on augmenting the use of computers, and so on, in the
administration of justice-and their number may be large, given the economies that
computers make possible and the clogged condition of most court dockets-will try
to convert Cr into C, concepts and thus increase the importance of required information Ie at the expense of required information I,. If such conversion is not
possible on a sufficient scale, efforts will probably be made to depreciate the relative
importance of Cr concepts and increase that of C, concepts. Suppose that such
conversion, or such revaluation, is carried out and that the relative importance of
Cr and Ir is greatly reduced. It may still happen that most of the information
actually or potentially available is of the I"r sort and that not much corresponds to
to Ia and thus to I. specifications. Again there will be need either somehow to
convert Ir information into Ia inforniation, or to depreciate greatly the role
of Ir information and appreciate that of lI, information.
What will be the upshot of these efforts at conversion and re-evaluation of concepts
and information? That depends upon how fixed and non-extensible categories C,
I, and Ia are. In proportion as they are fixed and non-extensible because of
technological limitations upon the improvement of computers and of economic and
other limitations upon the kind of computer-oriented information actually to be
had, efforts will probably be made to redefine rules of evidence, such as relevance,
kinds of evidence required, and so on. In other words, efforts will be made to gear
the concept-structure in use to the dimensions of C! and thereby to increase the
relative importance of I,. Then, given ex hypothesi that category C, is relatively
fixed, the dominant conceptual structure will be relatively fixed. Even though the
world to which the rules of law and justice are to be applied will be changing and
hence in need of frequent change in that part of its conceptual structure which
relates to law and justice, such needed change will be slow in coming and too, small
in amount when it does come. The resulting juristic conceptual structure, lacking
the dynamism of the economy and polity to which it relates, may become even
more maladjusted to this economy and polity than at present. For a conceptual
structure, be it juristic or otherwise, must, if it is to be of maximum usefulness,
remain flexible, much as an efficient language remains flexible and changes in
consonance with changing circumstances. Plato recognized this more than 2,ooo
years ago when in the Statesran he had the Eleatic Stranger say:23
23 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 322 (B. Jowett transl. 1937).
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...
the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest and most just for all and
therefore cannot enforce what is best. The differences of men and actions, and the
endless irregular movements of human beings, do not admit of any universal and
simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.
In this section we have shown how the introduction of the use of computer and
similar mechanical instruments into the administration of justice may prove unfavorable thereto and may thus tend to reduce the level of aggregate welfare as
reflected in a social welfare function W such as was described in the preceding
section. Computer use will do this in so far as it makes for imperfect analysis, for
misinterpretation of results, for bias in the application of findings, for avoidance of
responsibility for hard decisions, for conceptual rigidity, and for greater constraint
upon individual freedom than maximization of W requires. Computer use is more
likely to produce such effects in the very heterogeneous realm of justice than in other
relatively homogeneous realms, because in the former realm the primary concern
of most inquiries is the individual concrete instance or case, and not a somewhat
abstract and idealized (or conceptualized) instance that answers roughly to the
description of something that can be simulated or resolved through computer
methods. Thus many of the difficulties attendant upon computer use in the
administration of justice inhere in the problems involved rather than in the failure
of analysts to correct remediable shortcomings in the adjustment of computer
methods to the administration of justice. Problems of the latter sort can be overcome
whereas those of the former sort are likely to persist. One cannot, therefore, infer
that because case and code law have been somewhat adjusted to each other, a comparable adjustment of the requirements of ideal justice to the abilities of an ideal
computer is to be expected. The gap is reducible but not removable. The actual
impact of the use of computers in the administration of justice will be conditioned,
of course, by a country's legal structure and by the manner in which the apparatus
of state is employed. It is to this impact that we now turn in section three.
III
COMPUTER IMPAc

UPON JusTICE IN THE REAL

WoLD

The impact of the use of computers in the administration of justice is conditioned
largely by the extent of the regulatory role performed by the state, by the legal and
administrative structure employed, by the degree to which arbitrary use of power
is uncircumscribed, and by the capacity of private persons to arm themselves against
the use of computer-based information and analysis. Let us, therefore, examine some
of these conditions.
Of these conditions two are of especial importance, the extent of the role of the
state and the degree to which this role expresses the tastes and desires of the whole
population. In a nation in which the role of the state is small and justiciable matters
are largely resolved without state intervention, the computer could never play more
than a negligible part. Today, as a rule, however, the role of the state is very great,
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and this role tends to be reinforced by prevailing public opinion, this opinion having
changed gready since Marx's day when even his followers looked upon the current
state as an oppressive institution and when many non-Marxists shared Herbert
Spencer's belief that the function of "true liberalism" had become "that of putting a
limit to the powers of Parliaments" and to the growth of officials and officialism3 4
Yet even today, though the role of the state is extensive, it reflects in widely varying
degree the wishes of the whole population. Indeed, national societies are roughly
of three sorts, the "democratic," the state-dominated, and (at least in theory) those
falling between these polar categories. In an essentially democratic society the
state is the governing agency of that society and remains very subject to democratic
or popular indications respecting "who shall govern and to what ends";2 the social
welfare function sought through the apparatus of state tends to reflect that of the
whole population. By contrast, in a state-dominated society, typified by those of
present-day "communist" nations, the state has largely swamped the society from
which it emerged; the social welfare function sought is defined and implemented
mainly by the ruling circles, and in but partially restrained independence of the
social welfare function of the underlying population 2
In view of what has been said the argument developed in section two is not
likely to be accorded much weight in a state-dominated, or "communist" type of
state, though disregard of the dangers there noted would tend to reduce the extent
to which the avowed objectives of such a state could be reached. This argument is
of great pertinence, however, in the modern "welfare" or social-service state, though
the degree of this pertinence will be conditiond by the extent to which the judicial
process makes for the selection of those rules which respect "the facts of men's social
existence and ... promote an effective and satisfactory life in common."2'
Such an outcome tends to be favored more by the case-law approach associated
with the common law than by code lawY s For, as M. Polanyi has pointed out, this
approach exemplifies a system of spontaneous order whereunder coordination is
brought about largely through mutual adjustment and readjustment on the part of
individuals exercising private initiative. "The operation of Common Law thus
constitutes a sequence of adjustments between succeeding judges, guided by a
parallel interaction between the judges and the general public."2' 9 The underlying
" See
"See

HERBERT SPENcER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE 28, 107 (1884).
R. M. MAcIvER, TtEIWa osF Gov NMENT 193 , x96-98 (1947).

Within the "community,"

a delimited area of that web of relationships called society, "are generated many controls that are not
governmental controls, many associations that are not political associations, many usages and standards
of behavior that are in no sense the creation of the state. In the community develops the law behind the
law, the multi-sanctioned law that existed before governments began and that the law of governments
can never supersede." Id. at 193.
28 See, e.g., Downs, The Public Interest: Its Meaning in a Democracy, 29 SOCIAL RESEARCH 1-36
(1962).
2
" Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REV. 381 (946).
2' See id. at 392, for what appears to be Fuller's endorsement of this view. But see his comments
on legal realism in .4merican Legal Realism, in 76 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMmucAN PmLOsOpmCAL
SOCIETY xg (936).
" M. POLANYI, THE LoGIc ov LIBERTY 159-I62 (1951).
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method and approach are essentially experimental rather than deductive as under the
code approach.
The historic "common law" of Anglo-American jurisprudence is only a special case
of the universal principle common to all concerns that survive, of making new law by
deciding conflicts of interest, thus giving greater precision and organized compulsion
to the unorganized working rules of custom or ethics.80
Presumably, in so far as custom sanctions such an experimental and flexible
approach, the tendency will be strong for necessary readjustment to be accomplished
with minimum positive action on the part of the state much as price and cost
readjustments are accomplished within the realm of the market under the pressure
of "competition" rather than under that of state fiat. Indeed, this tendency, an
indirect concomitant of the experimental approach of common law, probably contributes far more to the augmentation of welfare than do the direct accomplishments
of the common-law approach.
A piece-meal, essentially backward-looking approach may not, however, be able
to keep pace with supposed needs in times of dynamic change. The resulting lag,
together with the desire to retain as much flexibility as practicable, has given rise
to legislation in many areas (e.g., labor relations, transport, commerce, taxation, and
so on) and to the devolution of related regulatory and judicial power to independent
administrative agencies. For one reason or another, however, the hoped-for celerity
and flexibility have not been realized; and there has been much complaint of undue
arbitrariness and non-uniformity (where uniformity is indicated).
Three decades ago already the Lord Chief Justice of England was warning of
"the new despotism" implicit in the substitution of "administrative law" for th6
"rule of law" and the associated increase in "the pretensions and encroachments of
bureaucracy." 3' The power of these agencies has since greatly increased, even in the
United States where complaint at unchecked administrative rule-making power gave
rise in 1946 to the Administrative Procedure Act, an act designed to guard the rights
of private litigants against government agencies!' Even so, it may prove difficult
to secure effective judicial review. It may also prove difficult to resist harassment
by administrative agencies, whether initiated by a Leviathan executive branch of the
government against objects of its wrath, or by "little men" with "big" authority and
3
misunderstandings or animus of one sort or another
Those subject to regulatory agencies may find themselves objects of prejudice.
" See JoHN R. COMMONS, INSTrItUTIONAL ECONOMICS 73, 72-74, 221, 239-40 (1934).
" LoRDuHEwAIr OF BURY, THE Naw DasPoTis'M chs. 1-3 (x929).

" Complaint at the progressive exemption of administrative agencies from judicial review was
See RoscoE POUND, ADNMINSTATIVE AoNcIEs

effectively expressed by Roscoe Pound, among others.
AND THE LAw

(American

Affairs Pamphlets, 1946).

See also FRANK E. COOPER,

ADMINISTRATIVE

AoENCIES AND TlE Cotmts (2951); Bookman, Regulation by Elephant, Rabbit, and Lar4, Fortune,
une 1961, p. 137 f.
11 Kristol, Big Government and Little Men, New Leader, Nov. 26, x962, p. 13. Fortune warns in an
editorial that the "discretionary scope of federal officials is now so wide that they can arbitrarily grant or
withhold prosperity from most of the larger businesses now operating in the U. S.-and ... without
violating the law." Whence "white corruption" tends to emerge. Fortune, Feb. 1963, p. 8a.
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It has, for instance, been suggested by a critic of the welfare state, Professor Sylvester
Petro, that some recent actions based upon the Sherman Act and related legislation
reflect "a suspicion of free enterprise and genuine free competition" and suggest that
action is likely to be directed against business by an administration "inimical to the
values of free enterprise."34 Against the infringement of individual rights and the
wrongs that result, neither the common law nor the courts appear any longer to be
adequate bulwarks and sources of remedy. Indeed, so great has become the threat
of the administrative juggernaut that in the English-speaking world consideration is
being given to adoption of arrangements resembling the office of Ombudsman
established in Nordic countries to guard the citizen against the bureaucrat. For like
reason in some of the emerging Asian nations (e.g., Ceylon, India, Malaya, Pakistan)
the type of control incorporated in the French Conseil d'Etat is commanding attention, in part on the ground that it is more effective and universally applicable than
the institution of Ombudsman 5
It may be noted parenthetically that the ultimate problem is that of achieving
measure of humane judicial control over the administrative process, a process that
computer use might render even more mechanistic and rational than it is already.
This can be accomplished more fully than at present by increasing recourse to
both judicialization of the adininistrative process and expansion of the scope of
judicial review over administrative action.

Given such increase, the role of the

common law tradition, always much better understood by the judiciary than by the
bureaucracy, will be enlarged, and administrative judgment will be better articulated
with the general standards of freedom and liberty implicit in that tradition. A byproduct will be erection of a more powerful barrier to the misuse of computer and
related methods3 6
It is conducive to individual and aggregate welfare in a modern "welfare" or
social-service state (even as in a less function-laden state) that the definition and
administration of justice be kept as flexible as possible and that individuals remain
as free from constraint by agencies of the state as is compatible with the objectives
specified and sought by the legislature (which presumably reflects the welfare

function of the underlying p6pulation).

The dangers arising from conceptual

rigidity, bias in analysis and interpretation, and other possible concomitants of the

use of computers in the definition and administration of justice tend to be very
great in a "welfare" state. In a dynamic society, furthermore, a conceptual structure,
"' Petro, The Growing Threat of Antitrust, Fortune, Nov. x96a, p. 128; also, unsigned, Signposts of
the Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Business, id. at 131. See also DONALD DEwEy, MONOPOLY IN
ECONOMICS AND LAW 309-10 (1959).
ar See, e.g., Rowat, An Ombudsman Scheme for Canada, 28 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. Sc. 543 (1962).
On Pakistani and Indian views respecting the need of the French type of bureaucratic control, see
Braibanti, Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan, in JosEPH LAPALOM13ARA (ED.), BUREAUCRACY
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1963), and GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF LAw, FOURTEENTH
REPORT OF THE LAw COMMISsION OF INDIA-REFORm OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 671-98 (X958).
IN

" This paragraph reflects my conversations with my colleague, Professor Ralph Braibanti.

On the

common law and the administrative process, See JAMES M. LANIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
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if relatively rigid (as is that summarized on the first line in table one), would become
increasingly badly geared to changing reality as time passed.
The dangers noted are certain to be accentuated, moreover, in the event that a
powerful and unchecked role is played by administrative agencies which enjoy a
large amount of autonomy and discretion and a considerable though not precisely
defined amount of freedom from restrictive judicial review and rights-guarding
action on the part of other complaint-handling agencies. At the same time the
individual, together with his counsel, may find himself handicapped if he lacks
inexpensive access to computers and similar instruments being utilized by the state
in building a case against him. The typical defendant will then find himself in a
position somewhat similar to that of Marx's proletarian who, lacking tools or the
assistance of public capital, was more or less at the mercy of the owner of capital
whose position was somewhat analogous to that of the modern state in a computerridden world from which the rhetorical supports of "justice" have been largely
removed.
CONCLUSION

In this essay I have shown how and why biases may be introduced along with
the use of computers and similar instruments in the definition and administration
of justice. Such bias is not always and necessarily a concomitant of the use of
computers and similar instruments, but it can easily become one unless effective
safeguards are set up. In many instances, moreover, computer use will necessarily
introduce bias because the subject matter is not adaptable to such use. Furthermore,
these instances are likely to increase in number as the relatively static conceptual
structure adapted to computer programming becomes increasingly less reflective
of a changing, dynamic reality and therefore misdirects and distorts inquiry. In so
far as this happens, justice will suffer and the augmentation of aggregate welfare
will be retarded. My main arguments were advanced in sections one and two.
In section one it was contended that aggregate welfare tends to be relatively
great when three conditions are present: when constraints upon decision-makers
remain as limited as possible; when decision-makers are free to change their
positions as circumstances change; and when the conceptual structures underlying
goal-directed behavior remain flexible. The value of freedom from constraint
beyond the minimum necessary to maximize some specified welfare function was
defined in instrumental terms. It was so defined because in many societies, such
as our own, we achieve justice and welfare in very large measure through the adjustment of individuals to one another as well as to changes in the external environment. In consequence, any unnecessary interference by the state with the
adjustment and negotiation processes involved, or with the freedom that makes
these processes possible, is adverse both to the objectives of "justice" and the
maximization of welfare.
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In section two it was shown that, under certain circumstances, increase in conceptual rigidity and bias is a highly probable even when not a necessary sequel to
the use of computers and similar instruments in the definition and administration of
justice. This may come about if computer-oriented concepts and information are
imperfectly adjusted to those portions of the world of reality in respect of which "justice" is sought. Then administrators, judges, and so on, must choose one of two
courses; they must accommodate their use of computers to these limitations; or they
must redefine "justice," together with the information required in its administration,
in such wise as to increase greatly the role of computers. Given the latter choice,
there results greater rigidity of the conceptual structure and increasing subordination
of the requirements of justice to the requirements of programming. It does not
follow, of course, that the latter choice would be made. Pressure for making it
might, however, flow from the clogged state of the courts and other facilities of
justice and from the great economy of time that use of computers seemingly might
make possible. It was also shown that reliance upon computer and similar mechanical instruments readily served in other ways besides rigidifying the conceptual
structure to introduce bias and distortion in the definition and the administration
of justice. Attention was not given to the possibility that man would develop
computing machinery capable both of receiving much more refined concepts in its
input and of reflecting these in its output; for then prohibitively large machines
would be required to reflect as much conceptual differentiation as optimal administration of justice calls for.
In the third section it was shown that the role of the state in society was steadily
increasing and that this increase in turn had given rise to increase in the role of
administrative agencies which are largely autonomous and markedly free of judicial
review. Under these circumstances, given the clogged state of many of these administrative agencies and the economies in time that computer use-might make
possible, the agencies in question were likely to find themselves under pressure to
orient their procedures to computer use, a task made easier in proportion as
these agencies remained free of judicial review and other restraints. The burden
of the argument advanced in the third section thus was that dangers from
the misuse of computers depend significantly upon the kind of society and state
making use of computers in the definition and administration of justice, and that the
modern state is particularly prone to such misuse.
It was also suggested in section three, though the argument was not developed,
that the frequentiy present disparity between the individual defendant and the
prosecuting state would be greatly enlarged by the introduction of computers, for
the state would probably be well-equipped with computers, and so on, whereas the
defendant and his counsel were likely to lack ready and economic access to such
equipment. Then the probability of bias against the less well-to-de defendant would
be enhanced. This possible source of difficulty may, of course, prove more avertable
or remediable than others to which attention was drawn in the third section.
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If the arguments we have advanced are valid, great care must be exercised to
avert the biases, the distortions, and the probable miscarriages of justice to which
we have drawn attention. If computers and other instruments are to be used, every
precaution must be taken lest the mechanical servant become master, and a tyrannical
instrument of justice would merely have
one at that. For then this new, supposed
7
Apprentice
Sorcerer's
become another
17 Arguments underlying F. B. Wiener's findings that reliance upon machines "rather than on his own
powers of reasoning and advocacy" blunts a lawyer's "professional techniques" are in keeping with some
of those put forward in this essay. See Wiener, Decison Prediction by Computers: Nonsense Cubedand Worse, 48 A.B.AJ. io23 (x962).

